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Abstract
Many real-world problems modeled by stochastic games have huge
state and/or action spaces, leading to the well-known curse of dimen-
sionality. The complexity of the analysis of large-scale systems is dra-
matically reduced by exploiting mean field limit and dynamical system
viewpoints. Under regularity assumptions and specific time-scaling
techniques, the evolution of the mean field limit can be expressed in
terms of deterministic or stochastic equation or inclusion (difference or
differential). In this paper, we overview recent advances of large-scale
games in large-scale systems. We focus in particular on population
games, stochastic population games and mean field stochastic games.
Considering long-term payoffs, we characterize the mean field systems
using Bellman and Kolmogorov forward equations.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic Game Theory deals with sequential situations of several decision
makers (often called players) where the objective for each one of the players
may be a function of not only its own preference and decision but also of
decisions of other players.
Dynamic games allow to model sequential decision making, time-varying
interaction, uncertainty and randomness of interaction by the players. They
allow to model situations in which the parameters defining the games vary
in time and the players can adapt their strategies (or policies) according the
evolution of the environment. At any given time, each player takes a deci-
sion (also called an action) according to a strategy. A (behavioral) strategy
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of a player is a collection of history-dependent maps that tell at each time
the choice (which can be probabilistic) of that player. The vector of actions
chosen by players at a given time may determine not only the payoff for each
player at that time; it can also determine the state evolution. A particu-
lar class of dynamic games widely studied in the literature is the class of
stochastic games. Those are dynamic games with probabilistic state tran-
sitions (stochastic state evolution) controlled by one or more players. The
discrete time state evolution is often modeled as interactive Markov decision
processes while the continuous time state evolution is referred to stochastic
differential games. Discounted stochastic games have been introduced in [29].
Stochastic games and interactive Markov decision processes are widely used
for modeling sequential decision-making problems that arise in engineering,
computer science, operations research, social sciences etc. However, it is well
known that many real-world problems modeled by stochastic games have
huge state and/or action spaces, leading to the well-known curse of dimen-
sionality that makes solution of the resulting models intractable. In addition,
if the size of the system grows without bound, the number of parameters:
states, actions, transitions explode exponentially.
In this paper we present recent advances in large-scale games in large-
scale systems. Different models (discrete time, continuous, hybrid etc) and
different coupling structures (weakly or strongly) are presented. Mean field
solutions are obtained by identifying a consistency relationship between the
individual-state-mass interaction such that in the population limit each indi-
vidual optimally responds to the mass effect and these individual strategies
also collectively produce the same mass effect presumed initially. In the finite
horizon case, this leads to a coupled system forward/backward optimality
equations (partial differential equation or difference equations).
1.1 Structure
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
overview the mean field model description and its wide range of applications
in large-scale wireless networks. We then focus on different mean field cou-
pling formulation. After that we present mean field related approaches. The
novelties of the mean field systems are discussed.
3
1.2 Notations
We summarize some of the notation used in the paper in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of Notations
Symbol Meaning
ft drift function (finite dimensional)
σt diffusion function at time t
xnj,t state of player j in a population of size n
qxux′,t transition probability at time t
Mnt mean field process
Lxx′,t(u,m) transition kernel of the population profile
xj,t limit of state process x
n
j,t
rt instantaneous payoff function
gT terminal payoff function
2 Overview of large-scale games
Population games
Interactions with large number of players and different types can be described
as a sequence of dynamic games. Since the population profile involves many
players for each type or class and location, a common approach is to replace
individual players and to use continuous variables to represent the aggregate
average of type-location-actions. The validity of this method has been proven
only under specific time-scaling techniques and regularity assumptions. The
mean field limit is then modeled by state and location-dependent time pro-
cess. This type of aggregate models are also known as non-atomic or popu-
lation games. It is closely related to von Neumann (1944) and mass-action
interpretation in Nash (1951). In the context of transportation networks,
interactions between continuum of players have been studied by Wardrop
(1952) in a deterministic and stationary setting of identical players.
In finite game, a (Nash) equilibrium is characterized by ∀j,
{xj ∈ Xj , mj,xj > 0} = support(mj) ⊆ arg max
x′
j
∈Xj
rj(ex′
j
, m−j)
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where rj(.) denotes payoff of j, Xj its action space and mj its randomized
action, m−j = (mj′)j′ 6=j .
In the infinite population game, a (Nash) equilibrium is characterized by
a fixed inclusion: the support of the population profile is included in argmax
of the payoff function,
{x ∈ X , mx > 0} = support(m) ⊆ argmax
x′∈X
rx′(m).
In other words, if the fraction of players under a specific action is non-zero
then the payoff of the corresponding action is maximized. This large-scale
methodology has inherent connections with evolutionary game theory when
one is studying a large number of interacting players in different subpop-
ulations. Different solution concepts such as evolutionarily state states or
strategies, neutrally stable strategies, invadable states have been proposed
and several applications can be found in evolutionary biology, ecology, control
design, networking and economics.
Overview of mean field stochastic games
We briefly present related works on mean field stochastic games.
• Discrete time mean field stochastic games with continuum of players
have been studied by [19] under the name anonymous sequential games. The
authors considered the evolution of the mean field limit in the Bellman dy-
namic programming equation. The work in [19] shows, under suitable condi-
tions, the existence of such mean field equilibria in the case where the mean
field limit of players’ characteristics evolves nonstochastically. The authors in
[5] showed how stochastic mean field limit can be introduced into the model
(so the mean field limit evolves stochastically).
• Decentralized stochastic mean field control and Nash Certainty Equiva-
lence have been studied in [17, 18, 14, 15, 46] for large population stochastic
dynamic systems. Inspired by mean field approximations in statistical me-
chanics and linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) differential games, the authors
analyzed a common situation where the dynamics and payoffs (costs,reward,
utility) of any given agent are influenced by certain aggregate of the mass
multi-agent behaviors and established the existence of optimal response to
mean field under boundedness and regularity assumptions. In the infinite
population limit, the players become statistically independent under some
technical assumptions on the control laws and the structure of state dy-
namics, a phenomenon related to the propagation of chaos in mathematical
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physics. In [16], the authors extended the LQG mean field model to non-
linear state dynamics and non-quadratic case for localized and multi-class of
players. LQG hybrid mean field games have been considered in [43].
• In [27, 25, 26] a mathematical modeling approach for highly dimen-
sional systems of evolution equations corresponding to a large number of
players (particles or agents) have been developed. The authors extended the
field of such mean-field approaches also to problems in economics, finance
and game theory. They studied n-player stochastic differential games and
the related problem of the existence of equilibrium points, and by letting n
tend to infinity they derived the mean-field limit equations such as Fokker-
Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation coupled with the mean field version of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming (HJBF). Applications to finance can be
found in [12]. The authors in [6, 7, 42] extended the framework to mean field
stochastic differential games under general structure of drift and noise func-
tion but also with major and minor players. The authors in [10, 24] applied
mean field games to crowd and pedestrian dynamics. Numerical methods for
solving backward-forward partial differential equations can be found in [1].
• Discrete time models with many firm dynamics have been studied by
[45, 44] using decentralized strategies. They proposed the notion of oblivi-
ous equilibria via a mean field approximation. Extension to unbounded cost
function can be found in [2]. In [3], a mean field equilibrium analysis of
dynamic games with complementarity structures have been conducted. In
[34, 40], models of interacting players in discrete time with finite number of
states have been considered. The players share local resources. The players
are observable only through their own state which changes according to a
Markov decision process. In the limit, when the number of players goes to
infinity, it is found that the asymptotic system is given by a non-linear dy-
namical system (mean field limit). The mean field limit can be in discrete
or in continuous time, depending on how the model scales with the number
of players. If the expected number of transitions per player per time slot
vanishes when the size of the system grows, then the limit is in continuous
time. Else the limit is in discrete time. Markov mean field teams have been
studied [34], Markov mean field optimization, controls and Markov decision
processes have been studied in [36]. Connection of the resulting limiting
mean field games to anonymous games or stochastic population games have
been established. A stochastic population game given by a population profile
which evolves in time, internal states for each player and a set of actions in
each state and population profile. The expected payoff of the player are com-
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pletely determined by the population profile and its current internal state. At
the continuum limit of the population, one can have (i) a discrete time mean
field games which cover the so-called anonymous sequential games or (ii) a
continuous time mean field games leading the so-called differential population
games. The corresponding limiting games fall down to
(i) Differential population games in which the optimality criteria leads an
extended HJBF coupled with FPK equations or,
(ii) Anonymous sequential games in which the leading dynamics are mean
field version of Bellman-Shapley equations combined with discrete time mean
field Kolmogorov forward equations similar to the prescribed dynamics de-
veloped by [19].
Networking applications
Below we present the relevance of large-scale games in large-scale networks.
Due to the limitations of the classical perfect simulation approaches in pres-
ence of large number of entities, mean field approach can be more appropriate
in some scenarios:
MFSG and continuum modeling
The simulation of multiple networks and their statistical modelling can be
very expensive, whereas solving a continuum equation such as partial dif-
ferential equation can be less expensive in comparison. Example of such
large-scale systems include:
• Internet of things with 2 billions of nodes,
• Network of sensors deployed along a volcano, collecting large quantities
of data to monitor seismic activities where transmissions are from relay-
node to relay-node until finally delivered to a base station
• Disruption-tolerant networks with opportunistic meeting in a large pop-
ulation of 20.000.000 nodes
Opportunistic interaction under random mobility:
The work in [10, 24] has modelled crowd behavior and pedestrian dynam-
ics using a mean field approach. Inspired from [10], one can get a random
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mobility model for the users. In [36] an application to malware propaga-
tion in opportunistic networking have been studied. This example illustrates
how mean field game dynamics can be useful in describing the network dy-
namics in absence of infrastructure, low connectivity and in absence of fixed
routes to disseminate information. The model has been extended to Brown-
ian mobility of players with communication distance parameter and energy
saving in wireless ad hoc networks. A challenging problem of interest such
in configuration is a routing packet over the wireless network from sources
to destinations (their locations are unknown and they can move randomly).
The wireless random path maximizing the quality of service with minimal
end-to-end delay from a source to a destination changes continuously as the
network traffic and the topology change. An expected element characterizing
the network state (mean field) and mean field learning-based routing proto-
col are therefore needed to estimate the network traffic and to predict the
best network behavior.
MFSG for carrier sense multiple protocols:
The mean field stochastic game approach has potential applications in wire-
less networks (see [2] and the references therein). Mean field Markov mod-
els have been studied in details in [9, 8] for Carrier Sense Multiple Access
(CSMA)-based IEEE 802.11 Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols and
gossip protocols. When the strategies of the users are taken into consider-
ation, one gets interdependent decision processes for the backoff stage: The
backoff process in IEEE 802.11 is governed by a Markovian decision process
if the duration of per-stage backoff is taken into account:
• every node in backoff state xθ attempts transmission with probability
1
γn+β2+β3 ln(n)
uθxθ for every time-slot;
• if it succeeds, the backoff state changes to 0;
• otherwise, the backoff state changes to (xθ + 1) mod (Kθ + 1) where
Kθ is the index of the maximum backoff state in class θ.
Extension to SINR-based admission control and quality of service (QoS)
management with backoff state can be found [36].
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Mean field power allocation
In [36] the authors study a power management problem using mean field
stochastic game. The mean field approach have been applied to dynamic
power allocation (vector) in green cognitive radio networks. The authors
showed that if the players react to the mean field and, if the size of the
system is sufficiently large then decentralized mean field power allocations
can be approximated equilibria.
MFSG for energy market in smart grid, chemical reaction and water com-
position and molecular mobility can be found in [36]
3 Basics of MFSG models
In this section we overview basics of mean field stochastic game (MFSG)
models.
3.1 Weakly coupling
Weakly coupling via the payoff functions The players are weakly cou-
pled only via the payoff functions if the individual state dynamics are not
directly influenced by the others states and strategies i.e
xnj,t+1 = f¯
n
j,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, w
n
j,t) (1)
where xnj,t is the state of player j, f¯
n
j,t is a deterministic function, u
n
j,t is the
action/control of player j and wnj,t is a random variable (independent to the
state and the action processes of others) with transition probabilities given
by
P(xt+1 ∈ X¯|xnt , unj,t, . . . , unj,0, xnj,0),
where X¯ is a subset of X . The instantaneous payoff function of player j may
depend on the state and/or actions of the others or the state mean field
1
n
∑n
j=1 1l{xnj,t=x} or the state-action mean field
1
n
n∑
j=1
1l{(xn
j,t
,un
j,t
)=(x,u)}
or the population profile process 1
n
∑n
j=1 δxnj,t , etc.
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Note that in dynamic environment, the players may not interact all the
time with the same set of neighbors. Some players may be active or inactive,
some new player may join or leave the game temporary etc. Then the payoff
function depends on the state and also the actions of all the players that
she/he meets during the long-run interaction.
A simple continuous time version of the above state dynamics is the fol-
lowing Itoˆ stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dxnj,t = f
n
j,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t)dt+ σ
n
j,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t)dBj,t (2)
where σnj,t is the variance function and f
n
j,t is the drift function for player j
at time t and Bj is a standard Brown motion (Wiener process). An example
of such dynamics is dxnj,t = u
n
j,tdt+ σ
n
j,tdBj,t
How the payoff depends on the mean field? When the number of players is
very large, the payoff function can be expressed in function of the mean field
under technical conditions. Here is a simple example. Let the instantaneous
payoff functions be in the following form
rnj,t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
r¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t).
Let recall that for any measurable bounded function φ defined over the state
space, one has
∫
w
φ(w)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxn
i,t
]
(dw) =
∫
w
φ(w)Mnt (dw) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(xni,t) (3)
Thus, the instantaneous payoff function is
rnj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t,M
n
t ) =
∫
w
r¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, w)M
n
t (dw).
The long-term payoff function can be in finite horizon or in infinite horizon
with discount factor or not.
Weakly coupling via the individual states Here we focus on the case
where the players are only weakly coupled via the individual states. In this
case, the payoff functions of each player depends only its own state and own
strategy but also his/her state is influenced by the other players states and
actions.
An example of such discrete time dynamics is
xnj,t+1 = f¯
n
j,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
−j,t, u
n
−j,t, w
n
j,t) (4)
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where transition kernel of wnj,t depends on the states and the actions of the
others: P(.|xnt , unt , . . . , un0 , xn0 ) where xn−j,t = (xnj′,t)j′ 6=j , xnt = (xnj,t)j, unt =
(unj,t)j, t ≥ 0.
An example of continuous time version is
dxnj,t = f
n
j,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
−j,t, u
n
−j,t)dt+ σ
n
j,t(x
n
t , u
n
t )dBj,t (5)
which covers the following dynamics:
dxnj,t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
f¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)dt
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)dBj,t (6)
The case where fnj,t and σ
n
j,t depend only the state are well-studied. Then,
the averaging structure becomes
dxnj,t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
f¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t)dt+
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t)dBj,t (7)
The last equation can be written in function of the mean field Mnt =
1
n
∑n
j′=1 δxn
j′,t
:
dxnj,t =
[∫
w
f¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, w)M
n
t (dw)
]
dt
+
[∫
w
σ¯nj,t(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, w)M
n
t (dw)
]
dBj,t (8)
For discrete time models, the similarity with the above methodology can
be done in the transition probabilities. Another way is to consider directly
the model in which the probabilities depend on the fraction of players with
specific state by considering 1
n
∑n
j=1 1l{xnj,t=x}. If the transitions depend only
on a local mean field then it can written as a function of mean field seen from
that player.
Weakly coupling via neighborhoods Consider the individual dynam-
ics in the form:

dxnj,t =
∑
i∈Nj ω
n
ij(t)f
n
θj ,t
(xnj,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)dt
+
∑
i∈Nj ω
n
ij(t)σ
n
θj ,t
(xnj,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)dBj,t,
xnj,0 ∈ X ⊆ Rk, k ≥ 1
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, θj ∈ Θ
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where coefficient ωnij(t) ≥ represents the influence of player i to player j at
time t. Then, player j has its own local mean field limitMnj,t :=
∑
i∈Nj ω
n
ijδ(xni,t,uni,t)
where n is the number of players, xnj,t is the state of player j, u
n
j,t is the control
of player j, Bj is a standard Brown motion (Wiener process), the coefficients
are normalized such that
ωnij ≥ 0,
∑
i∈Nj
ωnij = 1.
Then ωnij = 0 can be interpreted as the case where player i does not affect
the state dynamics of player j. The term θj is the type of the player j. Θ is
the set of types.
Then, under suitable conditions, the asymptotic of a subsequence of the
individual state dynamics lead to macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation with
local mean field limit under the form:

dxj,t =
∫
w′ fθj ,t(xj,t, uj,t, w
′) mj,t(dw′)dt
+
∫
w′ σθj ,t(xj,t, uj,t, w
′) mj,t(dw′)dBj,t,
xnj,0 ∈ X ⊆ Rk, k ≥ 1
uj,t ∈ Uθj
Note that the processes mj,t are interdependent and their laws can be ob-
tained as a solution of coupled systems of Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equa-
tions. Moreover, the convergence rate is in order of O( 1√
n
+ ǫ0n) where ǫ
0
n
captures the initial estimates and the gap at the initial distributions. We
refer the reader to [36] for more recent discussions on the convergence issue.
3.2 Strongly coupling
Here the state evolutions and the payoff functions depend on the state and/or
the strategies of some of the other players. Typically, most of games with
variable number of interacting during time fall down in the class of strongly
coupling mean field interaction. For example, the instantaneous payoff
rnj,t =
∑
i∈Nj
ωnij(t)r¯
n
θj ,t
(xnj,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)
and the state dynamics

dxnj,t =
∑
i∈Nj ω
n
ij(t)f
n
θj ,t
(xnj,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)dt
+
∑
i∈Nj ω
n
ij(t)σ
n
θj ,t
(xnj,t, u
n
j,t, x
n
i,t, u
n
i,t)dBj,t,
xnj,0 ∈ X ⊆ Rk, k ≥ 1
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, θj ∈ Θ
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lead to a strongly coupling mean field interaction.
4 What is new?
The novelties of the MFSG approach are in the characterization of the mean
field optimality1. Theses optimality equations differ from the classical dy-
namic games and dynamic programming principles.
4.1 Discrete time
In the mean field stochastic Markov game modeling in discrete time, there
must be an equation to express the dynamic optimization problem of each
player. Usually this involves one equation for each player. If players are clas-
sified together by similar player types, there is one equation per type. This
equation is generally a Bellman-Shapley equation, since a large proportion of
dynamic optimization problems with perfect state observation fall within the
framework of dynamic programming. Hence, the Bellman-Shapley equations
will be used to compute optimal behavioral strategies. An equation is also
needed to express the subpopulations’ behavior, the mean field behavior of
each type. The dynamics of the distribution is governed by a Kolmogorov for-
ward equation. In the Kolmogorov forward equation, the optimal behaviors
of the players occur as data, since it is the infinite collection of individual be-
haviors that is aggregated and constitutes collective behavior by consistency.
Thus, the modeling of the behavior of a group of players naturally leads to
a BS-K (Bellman-Shapley and Kolmogorov) system of equations. The dis-
crete BS-K have been studied by Jovanovic & Rosenthal in the eighty’s. The
novelty in their study is that the mean field games formalism involves the
density of players on the state space can enter in the Bellman-Shapley equa-
tion. Thus, the mean field equilibrium is defined by an BS-K system in which
the Bellman-Shapley equations are doubly coupled: individual behaviors are
given for the Kolmogorov forward equation and, at the same time, the dis-
tribution of players in the state space enters in the Bellman equation which
is completely innovative. This means that players can incorporate into their
preferences the density of states/actions of other players at the anticipated
1Note that “mean field optimality” refers to response to a consistent mean field. It is
not necessarily optimal in the finite regime.
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equilibrium. Therefore each player can construct his strategy by taking ac-
count of the anticipated distribution of strategies and of the actions of other
players. Under suitable conditions, this fixed-point of behaviors, the mean
field equilibria can be defined by moving to the limit on the number of play-
ers in the class of Markov games in discrete time (or difference games) that
are asymptotically invariant by permutation within the same type of players
called Asymptotic Indistinguishability Per Class2.
4.2 Continuous time
In the continuous time model, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming (HJBF)
equation will replace the Bellman equation and the Kolmogorov forward
equation becomes a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation. We then
get a coupled system of partial differential equations (PDEs). In addition, in
presence specific player such major player, its individual state dynamics at
the limit regime should be added to the system. Then, the question of ex-
istence, uniqueness, regularity, and performance bounds arise for the system
of PDEs. See the mean field games (MFG) lectures by Lions at College de
France.
4.3 Connection between the mean field models
The reader may ask what is the connection between all the above mean field
models.
Is there a connection between the discrete time Markov model and the
mean field differential game model?
The authors in [36] give a partial answer to this question. Under particu-
lar structure of payoff functions and probability transitions of the mean field
stochastic population game model one can get a mean field differential game
at the limit for vanishing intensity of interactions. This establishes a first
connection from discrete time to continuous time mean field model. Next,
we need to show that the convergence of subsequences of optimal strategies
and optimal payoffs under the Bellman-Shapley’s equation to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation under mean field dynamics. The authors provided
sufficient conditions for mean field stochastic games with random number
2These assumptions follow the line of the works by de Finetti (1931), Hewitt & Savage
(1955), Aldous (1983), Sznitman (1991), Graham (2000), Tanabe (2006), McDonald (2007)
etc.
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of interacting players for mean field convergence to stochastic differential
equations. Their techniques for the mean field optimality criterion combine
Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula with stochastic maximum principle.
A second connection can be obtained by considering mean field stochastic
difference game. Under specific time-scales, one show that the discrete time
mean field stochastic game converges to a mean field stochastic differential
game characterized by a non-linear macroscopic McKean-Vlasov, Fokker-
Planck-Kolmogorov and HJBF equations.
Following the same setting, one can design numerical scheme of the Itoˆ
stochastic differential to move from differential mean field model into differ-
ence mean field model. But still one needs to show that the strategies, the
values, ǫ−Nash properties holds under these scaling schemes because these
properties depends mainly on the proposed scheme for the time-derivative
and integration of the partial differential equations (PDE).
5 Mean field related approaches
In this section we present mean field related approaches.
5.1 Connection to mathematical physics
There are connections between exact microscopic models that govern the
evolution of large particle systems and a certain type of approximate mod-
els known in Statistical Mechanics as mean field limit. This notion of mean
field limit is best understood by getting acquainted with the most famous ex-
amples of such equations inspired from physics. The particle system model
describes the evolution of a generic player (particle) subject to the collec-
tive interaction created by a large number n of other players (particles).
The state of the generic player is then given by its phase space density;
the force field exerted by the n other players on this generic player is ap-
proximated by the average with respect to the phase space density of the
force field exerted on that particle from each point in the phase space. A
number of models have been studied in the literature. Those are McKean-
Vlasov equation, Fokker-Planck equations, mean-field Schro¨dinger equation,
Hartree-Fock equation, Bergers equation, Boltzmann equations, transport
equations, continuity equations etc.
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Incorporation of controls in these models give controlled mean field equa-
tions. If in addition a dynamic optimization setting were present, one gets a
large-scale dynamic game.
5.2 Connection to evolutionary dynamics
The paradigm of evolutionary game dynamics has been to associate relative
growth rate to actions according to the expected payoff they achieved, then
study the asymptotic trajectories of the state of the system, i.e. the frac-
tion of players that adopt the different individual and actions. The works in
[23, 30, 4, 28] derive mean field game dynamics for multiple-type population
games. These mean field game dynamics are generalization of evolution-
ary game dynamics (deterministic or stochastic). For large populations with
finite number of states and/or actions in X , the standard deterministic evo-
lutionary game dynamics based on revision protocols are in the form
m˙t(x) =
∑
x′∈X
Lxx′(mt)mt(x′)−mt(x)
∑
x′∈X
Lx′x(mt) (9)
which is a specific Kolmogorov forward equation. The term Lxx′ represents
a rate transition from x to x′.
This equation can be obtained from the drift limit and single selection
per time unit without control parameter ([28, 37, 13]). By specifying the
transitions probabilities L, one gets Replicator dynamics, Best-response dy-
namics, Smith dynamics, Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Orthogonal
projection dynamics, Target projection dynamics, Ray-projection dynam-
ics, Smooth best response dynamics, Imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs dynamics,
Multiplicative weight imitative dynamics, Generalized pairwise comparison
dynamics, Excess payoff dynamics, “Imitate the better” dynamics etc. See
[21, 22, 20]
5.3 Connection to the propagation of chaos
If the mean field stochastic games model satisfies the invariance in law by any
permutation with players index within the same type under specific controls
u that preserve this property, one can use the exchangeability per class or
indistinguishability per class [11] to establish a propagation of chaos [31, 32].
Let xnj = (x
n
j,t)t≥0. Then, the process Λ
n = 1
n
∑n
j=1 δxnj converges in law to a
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random process m˜ with law µ is equivalent to the so-called µ−chaoticity: for
any integer k, any measurable and bounded functions φ1, . . . , φk
lim
n
E

 k∏
j=1
φj(x
n
j )

 = k∏
j=1
(∫
w∈X
φj(w)µ(dw)
)
(10)
Non-commutative diagram Consider a population with n players. Denote the
mean field by Mnt =
∑n
j=1 ω
n
j δxnj,t where x
n
j,t is the state of player j at time t
and ωnj is the weight of player j in the hull population of size n. Then, given
a initial condition m0, denote by M
n
t [u,m0] the process M
n
t starting with the
distribution given by m0 at time 0 subject to the control u. The study of the
process Mnt [u,m0] is summarized in the following diagram:
Mnt [u,m0]
t −→ +∞
✲ ̟n[u,m0]
mt[u,m0]
n −→ +∞
❄ t −→ +∞
✲ ?
n −→ +∞
❄
If the limits are well-defined, we call ̟n = limt M
n
t and mt = limnM
n
t .
Then, the question is on the double limit i.e the commutativity of the dia-
gram.
It turns out that the double limit can be different. The diagram is not
always commutative.
lim
n
lim
t
Mnt 6= limt limn M
n
t .
This phenomenon is in part due to the fact that the stationary distribution
of the process ̟n is unique under irreducibility conditions and the dynamics
of mt may lead to a limit cycle. As a consequence, many techniques and
approaches based on stationary regime (such as fixed point techniques, lim-
iting of frequencies state-actions approaches in sequence of stochastic games,
replica methods, interacting-particle systems etc) need some justification.
This difference in the double limits (the non-commutativity phenomenon)
suggests to be careful about the use of stationary population state equilibria
as the outcome prediction and the analysis of equilibrium payoffs since this
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equilibrium may not be played. Limit cycles are sometimes more appropriate
than the stationary equilibrium approach.
The convergence to an independent and identically distributed system
is sometimes referred to chaoticity, and the fact that chaoticity at the ini-
tial time implies chaoticity at further times is called propagation of chaos.
This diagram says that, in general the chaoticity property may not holds
in stationary regime. This means that two randomly picked players in the
population may be correlated.
We mention a particular case where the rest point m∗ is related to the
δm∗− chaoticity. If the mean field dynamics of mt has a unique global at-
tractor m∗ then the propagation of chaos property holds for the measure
δm∗ . Beyond this particular case, one can have multiple rest points but also
the double limit limn limtM
n
t may differ from limt limnM
n
t leading a non-
commutative diagram. Thus, a deep study of the dynamical system is re-
quired if one want to analyze a performance metric for a stationary regime.
A counterexample of different double limits is provided in [36].
5.4 Weak convergence
• de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage Consider a complete separable metric space X and
a sequence of random processes (xnj )j,n, satisfying the indistinguishability per
class property i.e invariance in law of permutation within the same type/class.
Then, the population profile Mn converges weakly to a random measure m.
Moreover, conditionally to m, one has that for any integer k, any measurable
and bounded functions φ1, . . . , φk defined over X ,
lim
n
E

 k∏
j=1
φj(x
n
j ) | m

 = k∏
j=1
(∫
w∈X
φj(w)m(dw)
)
(11)
• Now we focus on the convergence of the pair (xnj,t,Mnt ). In the case
whereMnt goes to a deterministic objectmt, vanishing time-scales, it is shown
in [40] that the pair (xnj,t,M
n
t ) converges weakly to (xj,t, mt) where xj,t is a
continuous time jump and drift process (which depends onm)mt is a solution
of an ordinary differential equation.
5.5 Differential population game
In this subsection we provide a mean field equilibrium characterization of
the differential population game [34] where each generic player reacts to the
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mean field for a finite horizon [0, T ]. We first start by a payoff of the form
r¯t(u,m).
(∗) sup
u
[g¯T (mT ) +
∫ T
t
r¯t′(ut′ , mt′) dt
′]
subject to the mean field dynamics
mt = m0 +
∫ t
0
f˜t′(ut′ , mt′) dt
′.
We say the pair of trajectories (u∗t , m
∗
t )t≥0 constitutes a consistent mean
field response if u∗t is an optimal strategy to be above problem (*) where m
∗
t
is the mean field at time t and u∗t produces the mean field mt[u
∗, m0] = m∗t
A consistent mean field response is characterized by a backward-forward
equation 

v¯T (m) = g¯T (m)
−∂tv¯t = supu
{
r¯t(u,mt) + 〈∇mv¯t, f˜t(u,mt)〉
}
mt = m0 +
∫ t
0 f˜t′(u
∗
t′, mt′) dt
′
where u∗t is in argmax of r¯t(u,mt) + 〈∇mv¯t, f˜t(u,m)〉.
Next, we consider a individual state-dependent payoff rt(x, u,m). Define
F 1T (x, u,m) = gT (xT , mT ) +
∫ T
t
rt′(xt′ , ut′ , mt′) dt
′
where gT is a terminal payoff.
(∗∗) sup
u
[gT (xT , mT ) +
∫ T
t
rt′(xt′ , ut′, mt′) dt
′]
subject to the mean field dynamics
mt = m0 +
∫ t
0
f˜t′(ut′ , mt′) dt
′.
where the individual state xt = xt[u] is a continuous time Markov jump
process under u. We denote by q¯ the infinitesimal generator of xt[u]. See
[40, 34] for more details on the analysis of the process (xj,t, mt).
We say the pair of trajectories (u∗t , m
∗
t )t≥0 constitutes a mean field equi-
librium if {u∗t}t≥0 is a mean field response to be above problem (**) where m∗t
is the mean field at time t and u∗t produces the mean field mt[u
∗, m0] = m∗t
Consider a differential population game problem with single type. Assume
that there exists a unique pair (u∗, m∗) such that
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(a) there exists a bounded, continuously differentiable function v˜x : [0, T ]×
R
|X |, v˜∗x,t(m) = vt(x,m) and differentiable function m
∗ : [0, T ] −→ R|X |,
m∗t = mt[u
∗, m0] solution to the backward-forward equation:


vT (x,m) = gT (x,m),
−∂tvt(x,m) = supu
{
rt(x, u,m) + 〈∇mvt(x,m), f˜t(u∗, m)〉
+
∑
x′∈X q¯xux′,t(m)vt(x′, m)}
mt = m0 +
∫ t
0 f˜t′(u
∗
t′, mt′) dt
′
x0 = x ∈ X , m0 ∈ ∆(X )
(b) u∗t (x) maximizes of the function
rt(x, u,mt) + 〈∇mvt(x,m), f˜t(u∗, mt)〉+
∑
x′∈X
q¯xux′,t(mt)vt(x
′, m)
where q¯xux′,t(m) is the transition of the infinitesimal generator of xt under
the strategy u and m,
∑
x′ q¯xux′,t(m) = 0, the term
∑
x′∈X q¯xux′,t(m)vt(x′, m)
is ∑
x′ 6=x
q¯xux′,t(m)(vt(x
′, m)− vt(x,m)),
mt[u
∗, m0] = m∗t
Then, (u∗t , m
∗
t )t≥0 with m
∗
t = mt[u
∗, m0] constitutes a mean field equilib-
rium and v˜∗x(m
∗) = v(x,m∗) = Fx,T (u∗, m∗).
Similarly, for multiple types the systems becomes


vθ,T (yθ, m) = gθ,yθ(m),
−∂tvθ,t(x,m) = sup
uθ
{
rθ,t(yθ, uθ, m)+〈∇mvθ,t(x,m), f˜θ,t(u∗, m)〉
+
∑
y′
θ
q¯yθuθy′θ(m)vθ,t(y
′
θ, m)
}
mθ,t = mθ,0 +
∫ t
0 f˜θ,t′(u
∗
t′, mt′) dt
′
yθ,t = yθ, m0 ∈ ∆(X ), θ ∈ Θ.
Note that the applicability of this result is limited because in general the
argmax may not be reduced to a singleton.
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6 Mean field systems
6.1 Transition kernels:
In this subsection we briefly present the mean field systems. In the discrete
time case, the BS-K equation for finite horizon T is given by


mt+1(x
′) =
∑
xmt(x)Lxx′,t(u∗t , mt)
∀t, x, a such that mt(x)u∗t (a|x) > 0 =⇒
a ∈ argmaxb {rt(x, b,mt) +∑x′ vt+1(x′, mt+1)qxbx′(ut, mt)}
Under regularity and boundedness of the instantaneous payoff and the tran-
sition kernels, the existence of solutions of the backward-forward system can
be established using Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan-Debreu fixed point theorem.
6.2 Mean field Itoˆ’s SDE
In this subsection we present the backward-forward system for mean field
limit satisfying Itoˆ’s stochastic differential equation. The mean field system
for horizon T in continuous time for a payoff in the form E
(
gT (mT ) +
∫ T
0 rt(ut, mt) dt
)
is given by (McK-V-FPK):


v˜T (m) = gT (m)
− ∂
∂t
v˜t = suput∈U {rt(mt, ut)
+
∑
x∈X f˜t,x(mt, ut)
∂
∂mx
v˜t
+1
2
∑
(x,x′)∈X 2 a˜xx′,t(mt, ut)
∂2
∂mx∂mx′
v˜t
}
∂tmt + div
(
f˜t(mt, u
∗
t )mt
)
= 1
2
∑
x,x′ ∂
2
xx′ (a˜xx′,t(mt, u
∗
t )mt)
m0 ∈ ∆(X ).
where f˜t is the drift and σtσ
′
t = a˜t.
6.3 Stochastic difference games
Consider the stochastic difference equation in R :


xnj,tn
k+1
= xj,tn
k
+ δn
∑n
i=1 ω¯
n
ijfθj ,t(x
n
j,tn
k
, unj,tn
k
, xi,tn
k
)
+
∑n
i=1 ω¯
n
ijσθj ,t(x
n
j,tn
k
, unj,tn
k
, xni,tn
k
)
(
Bnj,tn
k+1
− Bnj,tn
k
)
xnj,0 = xj , t
n
k = kδn, k ≥ 0, δn > 0, limn δn = 0.
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where ω¯nij is a weight representing the influence of player to player j’s state.
We define the cumulative function F˜ n as F˜ n(t, w) =
∑n
j=1 ω¯
n
j 1l{xnj,t≤w} where
xnj,t is the interpolated process from x
n
j,tn
k+1
. For any T < +∞ there exists
c˜T > 0 such that
E ‖ F˜ (tnk , .)− F˜ n(tnk , .) ‖1≤ c˜T
[
‖ F˜0 − F˜ n0 ‖1 +
1√
n
+
√
δn
]
Moreover F˜ (t, .) is the solution of
∂
∂t
F¯θ¯,t(x¯) +
[∫
w
fθ¯,t(x¯, u¯, w)
∂
∂w
F¯θ¯,t(w)dw
]
∂
∂x¯
F¯θ¯,t(x¯) (12)
=
1
2
∂
∂x¯
[(∫
w
σθ¯,t(x¯, u¯, w)∂wF¯θ¯,t(w)dw
)2
∂x¯F¯θ¯,t(x¯)
]
(13)
θ¯ ∈ Θ, m¯0(.) fixed (14)
See [38] for more details. The finite horizon cost function optimization leads
to a coupled system of backward-forward equations:


vj,T (xj , m) = g(xj, m)
−∂tvj,t = supuj
{
rθj ,t(xj, uj, mj,t) + 〈f¯t(xj , uj, mj,t), ∂xvj,t〉
+1
2
σ¯2θj ,t(xj , uj, mt)∂
2
xxvj,t
}
dx¯θ¯,t =
∫
w fθ¯,t(x¯θ¯,t, u
∗¯
θ,t
, w)mt(dw)dt+
∫
w σθ¯,t(x¯θ¯, u
∗¯
θ,t
, w), mt(dw)dBt
x¯0 = q
∂
∂t
mθ¯,t +
∂
∂x
[
f¯θ¯,t(x, u
∗
t , mt)mθ¯,t
]
= 1
2
∂2
∂x2
[
σ¯2
θ¯,t
(x, u∗t , mt)mθ¯,t
]
θ¯ ∈ Θ, m0(.) ∈ ∆(X )
f¯t =
∫
w fθ¯,t(x¯θ¯,t, u
∗¯
θ,t
, w)mt(dw)
6.4 Risk-sensitive mean field stochastic games
A link between stochastic and deterministic mean field viewpoints is provided
by considering risk-sensitive stochastic approach. The risk-sensitive approach
consists to optimize the expectation E (g˜(R)) where R is the traditional long-
term payoff function. The certainty-equivalent expectation e(R) is defined by
g˜(e(R)) = (E(g˜(R))) . When g˜ = eyµ is exponential e(R) = g˜−1 (E(g˜(R))) =
1
µ
log
(
E
(
eµR
))
. Consider the finite horizon payoff:
Rµ :=
1
µ
∗ sign(µ) logE
(
eµ[g(xT+1)+
∑T
t′=t
rt′(xt′ ,ut′ ,M
n
t′
)]
)
,
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The intuitive view of the risk-sensitive criterion at zero is the following:
Taylor expansion at µ close to zero leads
Rµ = E(R) +
µ
2
var(R) + o(µ2)
This means that the risk-sensitive criterion takes into consideration not only
the expectation but also the variance!
When µ −→ 0 one gets the risk-neutral. Depending on the sign of µ,
one gets the risk-seeking case or the risk-averse case. The analogue of BS-K
becomes a multiplicative BS-K i.e a mean field version of the multiplicative
Bellman-Shapley equation coupled with Kolmogorov equation. Denote by
vj,µ,t the optimal payoff of player j with respect to m.


g˜(v∗j,µ,t(xt, mt)) = maxu∈∆(Aj(xt))
[
eµrt(xt,u,mt)∑
x′ qxtux′,t(mt)g˜(v
∗
j,µ,t+1(x
′, mt+1))
]
mt+1(x
′) =
∑
x¯∈X mt(x¯)Lx¯x′(u∗t , mt)
where
u∗t ∈ argmaxu e
µrt(xt,u,mt)
∑
x′
qxtux′,t(mt)g˜(v
∗
j,µ,t+1(x
′, mt+1)).
Considering individual state dynamics in the form of McKean-Vlasov,


dxnj,t =
(∫
w ft(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, w)
[
1
n
∑n
i=1 δxni,t
]
(dw)
)
dt
+
√
ǫ
(∫
w σt(x
n
j,t, u
n
j,t, w)
[
1
n
∑n
i=1 δxni,t
]
(dw)
)
dBj,t,
xj,0 ∈ Rk, k ≥ 1
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and a risk-sensitive cost criterion Rj(u¯j,M
n; t, xj , m)
=
1
µ
logE
(
eµ[gT (xT )+
∫ T
t
rs(xj,s,uj,s,M
n
s ) ds] | xj,t = xj ,Mnt = m
)
,
We assume regular and bounded coefficients and their derivation with the
respect to the states and u¯j : [0, T ]×Rk −→ Uj is piecewise continuous in t
and Lipschitz in x. The mean field system becomes HJBF +Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov equation + macroscopic McKean-Vlasov individual dynamics,
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i.e., 

dxj,t =
(∫
w ft(xj,t, u
∗
j,t, w)mt(dw)
)
dt
+
√
ǫ
(∫
w σt(xj,t, u
∗
j,t, w)mt(dw)
)
dBj,t,
xj,0 = x
∂tvj,t + supuj
{
∂xvj,t.ft +
ǫ
2
tr(σtσ
′
t∂
2
xxvj,t)
+ ǫµ
2
‖ σt∂xvj,t ‖2 +rt
}
= 0,
xj := x; vj,T (x,m) = gT (x,m)
∂tmt +D
1
x (mt
∫
w ft(x, u
∗
t , w)mt(dw))
= ǫ
2
D2xx (mt (
∫
w σ
′
t(x, u
∗, w)mt(dw)) ·
(
∫
w σt(x, u
∗, w)mt(dw)))
Under specific structures of drift, payoff and volatility functions, existence
result can be derived using fixed point theory. Also uniqueness issue can be
addressed under monotonicity conditions. However, the existence and the
uniqueness conditions of the above system under general structure remain a
challenging problem.
Here ft(.) ∈ Rk which we denote by (fk′,t(.))1≤k′≤k. Let
σt[x, u
∗
t , mt] =
∫
w
σt(x, u
∗
t , w)mt(dw),
Γt(.) := σt(.)σ
′
t(.) is a square matrix with dimension k × k. The term D1x(.)
denotes
k∑
k′=1
∂
∂xk′
(
mt
∫
w
fk′,t(x, u
∗
t , w)mt(dw)
)
,
and the last term on D2xx(.) denotes
k∑
k′′=1
k∑
k′=1
∂2
∂xk′∂xk′′
(mtΓk′k′′,t(.)) .
One can show that the asymptotic large deviations results as µ −→ 0, are
typically described through a risk-neutral mean field problem. This approach
is closely related to large-deviation, H∞−control, the minmax Hamiltonian
of Isaacs and robust mean field stochastic game. Preliminary results can be
found in [41]. The model can be extended to include random switching (jump
and drift process) and delayed state measurement.
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6.5 Explicit solutions of MFSG
There are few classes of mean field stochastic games in which explicit solu-
tions has been found:
• Mean field difference games with linear states and quadratic Hamilto-
nian
• Linear-quadratic mean field differential games,
• Mean-Variance mean field differential games
• Mean-Variance mean field difference games
• Risk-sensitive mean field games with exponentiated long-term quadratic
loss and linear dynamics.
More details can be found in [36].
6.6 Other extensions
• Extension to Poisson point processes, Levy flights, Feller processes etc.
• Learning in large populations Assume that the strategy of each player is
revised according to some dynamics which can be class-dependent drift and
class-dependent diffusion terms. Then, the limiting of the learning process
fall down into mean field PDE. When the diffusion is zero, one get the so-
called continuity equation or transport equation. We refer the reader to
[33, 35, 39] for recent developments on combined fully distributed payoff and
strategy reinforcement learning (CODIPAS-RL).
• Imperfect state measurement: Now, we assume that the state xj,t is not
observed by player j, but y¯j,t which is an output function of the state and
noise. Under such situations, a fundamental question is: how to estimate the
state under imperfect measurement using mean field stochastic games?
•Mean field stochastic games with correlated populations, different types
of players including major, minor and medium players, neighborhood based
partial monitoring, hierarchical structure, and dynamic conjectural varia-
tions.
• Mean field cooperative games; mean field network formation games;
mean field Stackelberg games, mean field Bayesian games etc. Mean field
Q-learning, Mean field H-learning: heterogeneous, hybrid, cost of learning,
random updates, noisy strategy in large-scale systems etc.
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• Mean field games under fractional Brownian motion, anomalous diffu-
sion (subdiffusion, superdiffusion).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented recent advances in mean field stochastic
games, their applications as well as their connections to related field in large-
scale systems. Below we point out some limitations and open issues for future
works:
• What about a system with small size (5, 7, 29, 31 players) ?
• The curse of dimensionality problems are transformed into a condensed
form (using localized density or aggregative terms). Are we able to solve
the resulting continuum variables? What is the complexity in solving
the continuum model?
• Is there a performance loss by using mean field approach? What is the
performance gap?
• Beyond the indistinguishability per class property, what is the class of
finite games for which the mean field approach can be applied? How
big is this class of games compared to the set of all games?
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